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 Adversaries of the United States have developed increasingly sophisticated 
military space capabilities in recent years, and the American advantage in space has 
shrunk accordingly. These nations have increased their investments in this new 
warfighting domain, creating offensive technologies that rival the American arsenal, 
while the U.S. has continued to divert funding and delay the implementation of new 
strategies that can help maintain air and space dominance. In response, the Trump 
administration has revived a combatant command that will focus on space-related 
missions, and has proposed the establishment of a new ‘Space Force’ that will become 
the sixth branch of the U.S. Armed Forces.  
 The idea of this new service was introduced by some members of the military 
community decades ago, so the White House proposition has the support of many leaders 
in the Pentagon and on Capitol Hill. However, there are scores of other influencers in the 
DoD and in Congress that do not believe that the creation of the Space Force is an 
appropriate measure to address emerging threats. The proposal has been criticized as a 
misguided restructuring that will only add burdensome bureaucracy, a money pit that will 
suck billions of dollars from other defense initiatives, and a campaign ploy meant to 
bolster Trump’s resume of accomplishments heading into the 2020 presidential election.  
 This essay will discuss the urgency for new U.S. space policy, the factors 
supporting and opposing Trump’s Space Force, and the political considerations for 
Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi. It will ultimately conclude that, though the U.S does 
need to rethink its space posture, it would be imprudent for Speaker Pelosi to support the 
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Action-Forcing Event  
A recent analysis by a former senior intelligence official indicates that the United 
States has fallen behind its adversaries in the race for space dominance.1 According to 
Glenn Gaffney, the former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Science and 
Technology Directorate, China and Russia have spent years developing infrastructure to 
optimize their space capabilities, while the U.S. has failed to invest sufficiently.2 China 
has demonstrated the ability to track and destroy satellites in orbit around the Earth, and 
is nearing completion of a weapon that can allegedly disable a missile defense satellite’s 
optical sensors.3 Russia has designed airplane-mounted lasers and missiles that can be 
activated mid-flight to damage enemy satellites.4 Iran and North Korea have also 
exhibited the ambition to invest in technologies that can attack American satellite 
communication systems.5 There is now mounting pressure on Congressional leaders to 
                                                     
1 Olivia Gazis, “U.S. falling behind in new space race, says CIA’s former head of science and tech,” CBS 
News, December 12, 2018, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/u-s-falling-behind-in-new-space-race-says-
cias-former-head-of-science-and-tech/. 
2 Ibid.  
3 Lara Seligman, “Space Force is Trump’s Answer to New Russian and Chinese Weapons,” Foreign 








create an effective strategy to ensure continued American warfighting supremacy that can 
garner support from both the Department of Defense (DoD) and the White House.6 
 
Statement of the Problem 
 American adversaries have been advancing their space capabilities in recent 
years, while the United States has struggled to sustain funding and improve readiness for 
a future conflict in space. This trend threatens to cede control of a critical warfighting 
domain to China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, which could weaken U.S. military 
dominance and endanger American troops and civilians at home and abroad. Figure 1 
demonstrates the percent change in U.S. spending relative to its two primary adversaries, 
China and Russia, both of whom have ramped up military investment in recent years. 
Meanwhile, the DoD budget has been curtailed relative to other federal spending, 
reducing the American advantage on the battlefield and in space.7 
 China is currently the most technologically-advanced adversarial nation, investing 
$11B in space-related programs annually, so it provides the clearest opposition to U.S. 
interests in space.8 To date, China has safely sent and returned manned flights into orbit, 
fielded two space stations with a third forthcoming, and created a lunar program that has 
landed unmanned rovers and promised to land Chinese astronauts on the Moon.9 China’s 
                                                     
6 Olivia Gazis, “U.S. falling behind in new space race, says CIA’s former head of science and tech.” 
7 Niall McCarthy, “How Military Spending Has Changed Since 2007,” Statista, February 3, 2018, 
https://www.statista.com/chart/12896/how-military-spending-has-changed-since-2007/. 
8 “Global Space Industry Dynamics,” Bryce Space and Technology, 2017, 
https://brycetech.com/downloads/Global_Space_Industry_Dynamics_2017.pdf. 
9 Todd Harrison, Kaitlyn Johnson and Thomas G. Roberts, “Space Threat Assessment 2018,” Center for 






posturing in the 21st century has led some experts to speculate that the nation’s goals are 
principally to protect Chinese space interests from U.S. interference and to coordinate 
attacks against American satellites to prevent U.S. dominance in outer space.10 This 
ambition to deny American superiority has led China to develop an arsenal of anti-
satellite (ASAT) weapons capable of disrupting and destroying enemy assets. The 
Chinese unveiled a new ASAT missile in 2013 which authorities claim could reach 
communications and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) satellites in 
                                                     
10 “2015 Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission,” U.S.-China 
Economic and Security Review Commission, 2015, 
https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Annual_Report/Chapters/Chapter%202%2C%20Section%202%20
-%20China%27s%20Space%20and%20Counterspace%20Programs.pdf. 
Figure 1: How Military Spending Has Changed Since 2017. 








geosynchronous orbit.11 An attack at this altitude could litter the affected region of the 
atmosphere with fragmented rubble that makes satellite operation impossible, posing a 
considerable hazard to American resources in the area. China has also experimented with 
similar ASAT weapons meant to attain higher orbits that could reach satellites at almost 
any altitude, conducting demonstrations as recently as 2018.12 In additional to ASAT 
missiles, the Chinese are believed to have developed weapons capable of using powerful 
laser systems to blind American satellites.13 Finally, the Chinese have demonstrated the 
ability to commandeer control of American satellites, having use advanced hacking 
techniques to gain control of NASA Terra Earth satellites in 2008.14 With these 
capabilities, China can challenge U.S. commercial and military enterprises and pose a 
substantial threat to national security. 
 Russia has long competed with the United States for supremacy in outer space, 
and today it displays an array of threatening technologies. The country has demonstrated 
the ability to maneuver an ASAT missile toward American satellites in mid-level orbits, 
while U.S. sensors misidentify the weapon as ordinary debris.15 The Russian military has 
also developed effective means to blind U.S. satellites and sensors, including plane-
mounted lasers that can fly at low-altitudes and dazzle instruments situated at much 
higher orbits. These weapons present a serious hazard for American assets, as tracking 
                                                     
11 “2015 Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission,” U.S.-China 
Economic and Security Review Commission. 
12 Bill Gertz, “China ASAT Test Part of Growing Space War Threat,” The Washington Free Beacon, 
February 23, 2018, http://freebeacon.com/national-security/asat-test-highlights-chinas-growing-space-
warfare-capabilities/. 
13 Edwin Cartlidge, “Physicists are planning to build lasers so powerful they could rip apart empty space,” 
Science Magazine, January 24, 2018, http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2018/01/physicists-are-planning-
build-lasers-so-powerful-they-could-rip-apart-empty-space. 
14 Todd Harrison, Kaitlyn Johnson and Thomas G. Roberts, “Space Threat Assessment 2018.” 






stealth objects moving as quickly as airplanes is difficult and the likelihood of 
intercepting them before they complete their mission is low.16 As such, Russia has 
invested in air-to-space technology meant to divert or destroy 100% of space-based 
enemy terminals.17 The Russians have also developed sophisticated jamming instruments 
which were successful in disabling radios, satellite communications, and drones during 
the Crimean annexation of 2014.18 There is also evidence to suggest that Kremlin 
officials deployed ground-based jamming devices in Syria to abet the Assad regime, 
demonstrating their ability and willingness to cooperate with other American 
adversaries.19 Finally, Russian hackers are among the most formidable in the world, 
having exhibited proficiency to attack and pirate satellites that do not feature state-of-the-
art data encryption.20 Russia has long been America’s primary space  opponent, and its 
continued excellence jeopardizes American interests across the globe.  
 Iran and North Korea have also made significant advancements to their space-
ready military arsenals. The Iranians have developed powerful lasers capable of blinding 
American ISR satellites, and they have used these systems to conduct more intentional 
                                                     
16 David Cenciotti, “Russia has completed ground tests of its high-energy Airborne combat Laser System,” 
The Aviationist, October 5, 2016, https://theaviationist.com/2016/10/05/russia-has-completed-ground-tests-
of-its-high-energy-airborne-combat-laser-system/. 
17 Todd Harrison, Kaitlyn Johnson and Thomas G. Roberts, “Space Threat Assessment 2018.” 
18 Sergey Sukhankin, “Russian Electronic Warfare in Ukraine: Between Real and Imaginable,” 
RealClearDefense, May 26, 2017, 
https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2017/05/26/russian_electronic_warfare_in_ukraine_ 
111460.html. 
19 Elias Groll, “Spy Planes, Signal Jammers, and Putin’s High-Tech War in Syria,” Foreign Policy, October 
6, 2015, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/10/06/spy-planes-signal-jammers-and-putins-high-tech-war-in-
syria. 
20 Ellen Nakashima, “Russian hacker group exploits satellites to steal data, hide tracks,” The Washington 







obstruction of U.S. space operations than any other nation.21 Iranian engineers used these 
capabilities to jam the satellite signal of an American RQ-170 drone in 2011, eventually 
allowing them to assume control of the aircraft and ground it.22 Pyongyang has also 
invested in jamming technology, using it to jam South Korean satellite terminals in 
2016.23 Iran and North Korea now both have the ballistic missile expertise to launch an 
ASAT weapon into orbit and create a perilous debris field that threatens all nearby 
satellites.24 If the Iranians and North Koreans are successful in their nuclear weapons 
programs, they could use high-altitude missiles to create a space-born nuclear warhead, 
which could itself disperse radiation and fallout over millions of square miles.25 Tehran 
and Pyongyang have also established themselves as world leaders in cyber warfare, 
proving their ability to hack foreign systems in the massive attacks on US firms in recent 
years.26 Because many companies that secure private networks are also contracted to 
secure military networks, the American military and its space assets remain susceptible to 
cyber-attacks by these nations. 
  In response to the strengthening space postures of America’s adversaries, some 
Pentagon leaders have become concerned with U.S. readiness. Among them is Deputy 
Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Robert Work, who in 2015 voiced his fear that the 
                                                     
21 Micah Zenko, “Dangerous Space Incidents,” Council on Foreign Relations, 2014, https://cfrd8-
files.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2014/04/CPA_ContingencyMemo_21.pdf. 
22 Scott Peterson and Payam Faramarzi, “Exclusive: Iran hijacked U.S. drone, says Iranian engineer,” The 
Christian Science Monitor, December 15, 2011, https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-
East/2011/1215/Exclusive-Iran-hijacked-US-drone-says-Iranian-engineer. 
23 “South Korea tells U.N. that North Korea GPS jamming threatens boats, planes,” Reuters, April 11, 
2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-southkorea-gps/south-korea-tells-u-n-that-north-
korea-gps-jamming-threatens-boats-planes-idUSKCN0X81SN. 
24 Todd Harrison, Kaitlyn Johnson and Thomas G. Roberts, “Space Threat Assessment 2018.” 
25 Steve Lambakis, “Foreign Space Capabilities: Implications for U.S. National Security,” National 
Institute for Public Policy, September 2017, http://www.nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Foreign-
Space-Capabilities-pub-2017.pdf. 





American military is not adequately prepared for a conflict in space.27 Only months after 
his comments, American forces were crippled by an exercise that posed a mock attack on 
U.S. satellites, demonstrating their vulnerability to strategic interference.28 P.W. Singer, a 
foremost expert on 21st century warfare, has warned the U.S. should prepare to lose the 
next World War if it is fought in space, explaining that victory is unlikely given the 
current state of American defenses.29 Even General William Shelton, the former head of 
U.S. Space Command (USSPACECOMM), admitted in 2016 that the American military 
is currently incapable of protecting its satellite fleet from foreign weapons.30  
The potential damage an attack could inflict upon the U.S. goes far beyond the realm 
of pure national security. In addition to supporting military machines, American satellites 
provide civilian communication channels and GPS information that is critical to the 
everyday functioning of the world’s financial systems.31 The destruction of even one of 
the hundreds of American satellites that provide these services could therefore prove to 
be catastrophic for the Pentagon and the world economy at large, bringing commerce to a 
standstill. These concerns from military experts indicate that the U.S. needs to change its 
posture quickly, or else it will be susceptible to crippling attacks that threaten American 
military dominance and civilian safety in the homeland.  
Though the U.S. has all of the same offensive capabilities as its adversaries, and 
many more advanced weapons as well, the concept of mutually assured destruction 
                                                     





31 Tim Fernholz, “The entire global financial system depends on GPS, and it’s shockingly vulnerable to 






(MAD) does little to allay the apprehensions of those who seek to strengthen the 
Pentagon’s defenses in space. There are far fewer treaties governing the use of force in 
space, and attacks on satellites can be made to appear much more accidental (i.e. two 
satellites colliding) than a nuclear strike.32 This means that countries that act 
provocatively in space have less to fear in the way of international sanctions and 
retaliation than those who would threaten nuclear belligerence. As such, MAD is not 
guaranteed to prevent America’s adversaries from aggression, especially those whose 
governments espouse more extremist views.33 For these reasons, the U.S. must rethink 
how it defends American assets in space.  
 
History/Background 
 Following the end of World War II, the U.S. Air Force (USAF) officially 
separated from the US Army, becoming the first new branch of the American military in 
over 150 years. The War Department had preferred a proposal to combine the Army and 
Navy into one branch, which would have unified the command structure for the nation’s 
land, air, and sea defense.34 The Navy, however, vehemently opposed this arrangement, 
and the establishment of an independent USAF was meant to be a compromise that would 
provide equal executive representation to each of the three branches.35  
                                                     
32 Henry D. Solkolski, “Getting MAD: Nuclear Mutually Assured Destruction, Its Origins and Practice,” 
Strategic Studies Institute, November 2004, https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/pub585.pdf. 
33 Ibid. 








During this time, relations between the United States and the Soviet Union 
worsened until the two found themselves in a so-called “Cold War.”36 The countries 
competed for dominance in many domains, and one of the most public such competitions 
concerned the development of space technology, which had gained relevance when 
Germany fielded the powerful V-2 rocket, man’s first creation capable of reaching sub-
orbital flight.37 The Americans were able to capture a number of German scientists after 
WWII, and soon put them to work improving their designs to give the U.S. a world-class 
rocket arsenal.38 Despite the efforts of these pioneering engineers, the Soviets began to 
lead the U.S. in the race for space dominance in the 1950s and 1960s.  They placed the 
first satellite into orbit with the launch of Sputnik I in 1957, and sent the first man into 
space when Yuri Gagarin flew Vostok I around the Earth in 1961.39 The U.S., in part 
threatened by the potential to weaponize these systems, established the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration, or NASA, which quickly developed the 
technology to send American John Glenn into orbit in 1962.40 In the years after, Russia 
would win the race to the heavens by crash-landing a probe on Venus, the U.S. would 
win a race to the Moon by landing Apollo IV on the lunar surface, and both nations 
would work behind closed doors to create capabilities that harnessed these emerging 
innovations.41  
                                                     
36 “The Cold War Erupts,” UShistory.org, accessed February 13, 2019, 
http://www.ushistory.org/us/52a.asp. 
37 Jennifer Llewellyn, Jim Southey and Steve Thompson, “The Space Race,” Alpha History, November 14, 
2018, https://alphahistory.com/coldwar/space-race/. 








The United States, however, began tapering its investments in space development 
after the American and Soviet space programs joined forces on the Apollo-Soyuz Test 
Project in 1975.42 The budget for NASA had peaked in 1966 at 4.41% of U.S. spending, 
but only a decade later this figure had fallen to less than 1%, and today it is less than 
.5%.43 The U.S. did continue to create new space-related projects, such as the short-lived 
Strategic Defense Initiative (also called “Star Wars”), but the program, and others like it, 
were shuttered as relations with the Soviet Union softened and war seemed less 
imminent.44  
The Americans created the Air Force Space Command (AFSPC – pronounced 
“af-space”) in 1982 to lead space operations, and USSPACECOMM in 1985 to facilitate 
cooperation between the branches of the military in outer space.45 Senior government 
officials soon began advocating for the consolidation of these space capabilities, as 
detailed in a 2001 Rumsfeld Space Commission report.46 The commission recommended 
the development of a new Space Corps to be created as a division of the USAF, writing 
that the DoD should begin taking the bureaucratic and procedural measures necessary for 
the establishment of a “Space Department.”47 Despite these recommendations, the 9/11 
terror attacks drew the attention of the DoD away from forward-thinking initiatives as the 
nation prepared for war. USSPACECOMM funding was slashed and the program’s 
                                                     
42 Jennifer Llewellyn, Jim Southey and Steve Thompson, “The Space Race.” 
43 “NASA budgets: US spending on space travel in 1958,” The Guardian, 2016, 
https://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2010/feb/01/nasa-budgets-us-spending-space-travel. 
44 Ibid. 
45 “Air Force Space Command,” U.S. Air Force, September 10, 2015, https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-
Sheets/Display/Article/104526/air-force-space-command/. 







responsibilities were transferred to the United States Strategic Command 
(USSTRATCOMM) in 2002.48 AFSPC was also pared down in 2009, when its nuclear 
arsenal was transferred to the newly founded Air Force Global Strike Command.49 The 
focus of the DoD in the 21st century had shifted from space dominance to 
counterterrorism, so the U.S. began to lose ground to its adversaries, who had been 
continuously refining their space technology.50 
Though the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. tempered their space programs as the Cold War 
waned, other nations raced to develop their own capabilities for exploration and defense. 
China launched its space program in 1958, and in 1970 it guided its first satellite into 
orbit.51 By 2007, China had developed the missile technology to shoot down an enemy 
satellite, causing alarm for the U.S. and its allies who feared a new arms race.52 After 
years of rocket development, North Korea launched its first satellite into orbit in 2012, 
showing its adversaries that it was now capable of reaching enemy satellites and 
conducting orbital military operations itself.53 Iran partnered with both China and North 
Korea to use their technologies for the development of the Iranian arsenal of satellite-
bearing rockets capable of reaching low Earth orbit.54  
                                                     
48 Gary Shugart, “Re-establishing U.S. Space Command,” Purview, October 1, 2018, 
http://purview.dodlive.mil/2018/10/01/reestablishing-u-s-space-command/.  
49 “Air Force Space Command,” U.S. Air Force. 
50 Gary Shugart, “Re-establishing U.S. Space Command,” Purview. 
51 Eliza Strickland, “Timeline: China’s Space Program, Past and Future,” IEEE Spectrum, January 3, 2014, 
https://spectrum.ieee.org/static/timeline-chinas-space-program-past-and-future. 
52 William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, “Flexing Muscle, China Destroys Satellite in Test,” New York 
Times, January 19, 2007, https://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/19/world/asia/19china.html. 
53 “North Korea defies warnings in rocket launch success,” BBC, December 12, 2012, 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-20690338. 






These accomplishments and others shrank the American advantage in space. The 
U.S. government still has an arsenal capable of commandeering and/or destroying enemy 
satellites at almost any altitude, state-of-the-art jamming and blinding terminals, and a 
world-class offensive cyber hacking force.55 Indeed, there is no weaponized technology 
currently possessed by another nation that the U.S. has not developed itself.56 However, 
the success that American adversaries have had in catching up to U.S. weaponry is 
nonetheless cause for considerable alarm, as the DoD cannot currently defend American 
commercial and military assets from the sophisticated ASAT weapons now possessed by 
rival nations.57 So, though the U.S. spends much more than any other country on space 
defense and has by far the most powerful array of offensive tools, it is still susceptible to 
severe damage to military and civilian space infrastructure, particularly if its adversaries 
cooperate as they have in the past.58  
 The issue of space reform began to take center stage in the U.S. in 2016, when the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) published a report detailing the inefficiencies 
that inhibit the federal government from conducting timely and effective space 
acquisitions.59 The document listed “fragmented leadership, a redundant oversight 
bureaucracy, and difficulty coordinating among numerous stakeholders” as factors that 
add unnecessary time delays and ultimately can yield obsolete technology by the time 
                                                     
55 David Axe, “When it comes to war in space, U.S. has the edge,” Reuters, August 10, 2015, 
http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2015/08/09/the-u-s-military-is-preparing-for-the-real-star-wars/. 
56 Ibid. 
57 “Competing in Space,” National Air and Space Intelligence Center, December 2018, 
https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jan/16/2002080386/-1/-1/1/190115-F-NV711-0002.PDF. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Christina Chaplain, “Defense Space Acquisitions: Too Early to Determine if Recent Changes will 
Resolve Persistent Fragmentation in Management and Oversight,” U.S. Government Accountability Office, 





contracts are awarded.60 To ensure that the U.S. does not continue to utilize outmoded 
solutions, the GAO offered a number of possible solutions, one of which specified the 
creation of an independent Space Force.61   
Following this recommendation, Congressmen Mike Rogers (R – AL) and Jim 
Cooper (D – TN) included language to create a new military department for space 
missions in their draft of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal 
Year (FY) 2018.62 Though this language was not adopted in the final version of the FY18 
NDAA, it would have created an autonomous “space corps” within the Department of the 
Air Force, in the same way that the Marine Corps falls under the umbrella of the 
Department of the Navy.63 The final FY18 NDAA did, however, mandate that the 
government “seek to enter into a contract with a federally funded research and 
development center that is not closely affiliated with the Department of the Air Force to 
develop a plan to establish a separate military department responsible for the national 
security space activities of the Department of Defense.”64  
Seven months after the ratification of the FY18 NDAA, on June 18, 2018, 
President Donald Trump formally directed the Pentagon to begin the process of 
establishing a sixth branch of the military to be called the U.S. Space Force.65 The FY19 
NDAA, signed into law by President Trump on August 13, 2018, directed the re-
establishment of the United States Space Command as a sub-unified command within 
                                                     
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Sandra Erwin, “Congressman Rogers: A Space Corps Is ‘Inevitable,’” Space News, December 2, 2017, 
http://spacenews.com/congressman-rogers-a-space-corps-is-inevitable. 
63 Ibid. 
64 U.S. Congress, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, Public Law 115-91, 115th 
Cong., 1st sess., 2017, H.R. 2810. https://www.congress.gov/115/plaws/publ91/PLAW-115publ91.pdf. 





USSTRATCOM responsible for joint operations in space.66 Then, on February 19, 2019, 
Trump signed Space Policy Directive 4 (SPD-4), which formally tasked the SECDEF 
with drafting a legislative proposal to establish the Space Force.67 
 Given the broad reach of these actions, there are now many stakeholders with a 
vested interest in U.S. Space Force debate. An obvious player is the DoD, whose leaders 
expressed serious misgivings about the efficacy of a new space branch before being 
directed to establish it.68 Staunchly opposed to the Space Force were Secretary of the Air 
Force (SECAF) Heather Wilson, Air Force Chief of Staff General David Goldfein, and 
SECDEF James Mattis.69 Wilson decried the idea as adding unwarranted costs and 
complexity to a Pentagon that is already infamously afflicted by chronic overspending 
and bureaucracy.70 Wilson has since resigned amid reports that she and President Trump 
disagreed on their visions for the future of the Air Force.71 Mattis wrote that “[at] a time 
when we are trying to integrate the [DoD’s] joint warfighting functions, I do not wish to 
add a separate service that would likely present a narrower and even parochial approach 
                                                     
66 U.S. Congress, John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Public Law 
115-232, 115th Cong., 2nd session, 2018, H.R. 5515, https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-
bill/5515. 
67 Marcia Smith, “Text of Space Policy Directive-4 (SPD-4): Establishing a U.S. Space Force,” Space 
Policy Online, February 19, 2019, https://spacepolicyonline.com/news/text-of-space-policy-directive-4-
spd-4-establishing-a-u-s-space-force/. 
68 Dan LaMothe, “Once a skeptic of a Space Force-type plan, Heather Wilson now leads the effort to build 
it,” The Washington Post, February 22, 2019, https://www.stripes.com/news/us/once-a-skeptic-of-a-space-
force-type-plan-heather-wilson-now-leads-the-effort-to-build-it-1.569926. 
69 Jay Bennett, “Space Corps Moves Forward Despite Opposition From Mattis, White House,” Popular 
Mechanics, July 13, 2017, https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/news/a27285/james-mattis-
opposes-space-corps-military-branch/. 
70 Ibid. 







to space operations.”72 Mattis has also since resigned, citing fundamental disagreements 
with Trump’s military policies.73 These senior officials also voiced concern about the 
cost of establishing the new Space force and revived USSPACECOM. An estimate from 
Secretary Wilson’s office claimed that establishing these two organizations would require 
an additional $13B over five years, far more than the Trump administration’s estimate of 
$73M per year.74 Nonetheless, DoD leaders are now responsible for carrying out the 
vision of the Commander-in-chief, so any initial reservations must now be swallowed 
until they are given new direction.  
  Though the executive branch has sizeable authority over military affairs, it is 
Congress that will ultimately determine whether or not the U.S. Space Force ever comes 
to fruition. Since the Democrats won a majority in the House of Representatives in the 
2018 election, any legislation supporting the establishment of the Space Force is expected 
to meet stiff opposition from Trump’s opponents.75 Rep. Adam Smith (D-WA), the new 
Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee (HASC), has already expressed 
concerns that the additional costs and bureaucracy of the Space Force would not be offset 
by its military merits.76 This standing committee is currently composed of 31 Democrats 
and 26 Republicans, the majority of whom would need to support a bill to create the 
                                                     
72 Katie Rogers, “Trump Orders Establishment of Space Force as Sixth Military Branch,” The New York 
Times, June 18, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/18/us/politics/trump-space-force-sixth-military-
branch.html. 
73 Helene Cooper, “Jim Mattis, Defense Secretary, Resigns in Rebuke of Trump’s Worldview,” The New 
York Times, December 20, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/20/us/politics/jim-mattis-defense-
secretary-trump.html. 
74 Dan LaMothe, “Once a skeptic of a Space Force-type plan, Heather Wilson now leads the effort to build 
it.” 
75 Scott Bomboy, “Space Force could hit a constitutional roadblock: The House,” National Constitution 







Space Force before it could reach the House floor for a vote.77 Though the Republicans 
retained control of the Senate in the 2018 elections, the Chairman of the Senate Armed 
Services Committee, James Inhofe (R-OK), has himself expressed skepticism that a new 
military branch is warranted for space.78 When discussing priorities for the upcoming 
NDAA, Inhofe referred to the Space Force and remarked “I don’t think we need it.”79 
 Another clear stakeholder is the defense industry, composed of hundreds of small 
and large businesses that receive DoD contracts to provide services and materiel to the 
military. Vice President Mike Pence has requested an additional $8B to be allocated to 
space acquisitions, a figure that excites many firms hoping to carve out a piece of that 
figure for themselves.80 Large organizations, such as the United Launch Alliance (ULA), 
a joint venture between Boeing Defense and Lockheed Martin Space Systems, as well as 
Blue Horizon and SpaceX plan to compete with each other for these lucrative contracts, 
potentially driving prices down.81 Small businesses also hope to gain from the new 
branch, as Todd Harrison of the Center for Strategic and International Studies explains. 
These firms hope that the proposed Space Development Agency, tasked with overhauling 
space acquisitions, would offer them opportunities to compete for more DoD contracts 
and allow them to be more cross-functional in the national security field.82  
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It has been theorized that other civilian space-related federal agencies could be 
impacted by the introduction of a Space Force. However, though these programs may 
experience some indirect consequences due to the establishment of a Space Force, there 
is no evidence to suggest that any non-DoD departments would be shuttered or otherwise 
disrupted. In SPD-4, President Trump stipulated that the scope of his proposed Space 
Force would “not include the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the National Reconnaissance Office, 
or other non-military space organizations or missions of the United States 
Government.”83 As such, non-DoD federal agencies do not appear to be in danger of 
having their missions folded into this new department.  
 
Description of Policy Proposal 
The Trump administration’s Space Force proposal is intended to reorganize existing 
manpower and resources to reduce the number of agencies involved in space acquisitions, 
increase the amount of troops in space-related fields, and improve the protection of 
American interests and assets in outer space.84 These assets include military and civilian 
satellites that are used for navigation, intelligence, science, communications, and other 
fields.85 Congress and the White House have already taken several actions to further this 
agenda, ordering the reestablishment of USSPACECOMM and directing the SECDEF to 
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prepare formal Space Force legislation for consideration.86 The following proposal 
represents measures that the Trump administration is expected to propone in order to 
complete the restructuring of national security organizations for improved space 
capability and readiness.  
 In SPD-4, President Trump dictates that the Space Force would be created under 
the umbrella of the USAF, in a situation analogous to the Marine Corps’ status as a 
subdivision of the Department of the Navy.87 This new Space Force would “organize, 
train, and equip military space forces of the United States to ensure unfettered access to, 
and freedom to operate in, space, and to provide vital capabilities to joint and coalition 
forces in peacetime and across the spectrum of conflict.”88 In other words, the Space 
Force would be responsible for consolidating and preparing the manpower that supports 
USSPACECOM operations, as the combatant command owns the actual war-fighting and 
space defense missions.89 This branch would fulfill its mission by absorbing the 
infrastructure and personnel of other DoD organizations whose missions align within the 
scope of space defense.90 Though the Army and Navy do have some units that directly 
support space operations, the vast majority of the resources needed to be transferred to 
the fledgling Space Force would come from the USAF, currently the DoD’s primary 
space authority.91 However, other missions that are only obliquely related to space, such 
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as cyber defense, would remain with their current organizations, at least at the outset.92 
Non-military agencies, such as the National Reconnaissance Office and NASA, would 
also not be included in the new Space Force.93 The new branch would be led by a civilian 
Under Secretary of Space, and would appoint a 4-star General or Admiral to Chief of 
Staff of the Space Force, who would then serve on the Joint Chiefs of Staff.94 Figure 2 
shows the designs introduced by the Trump administration as possible logos for the 
Space Force.  
The Trump administration also plans to have the Pentagon introduce a new 
organization for the development and acquisition of future DoD space systems, to be 
called the Space Development Agency, or SDA. This organization will be responsible for 
creating acquisitions processes that are specifically tailored to space-related materiel, 
hoping to reduce time delays and inefficiencies that result from ill-suited regulations that 
are more applicable to USAF aircraft and weapons systems than spacecraft.95 It will 
resemble “the Air Force Rapid Capabilities Office  which provides a model for the 
thinking, execution style, reporting structure and innovation required for creating 
warfighting dominance, and the DoD Strategic Capabilities Office which leverages 
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existing DoD technologies to rapidly field new capabilities.”96 The SDA will not fall 
under any specific branch at its inception, instead representing an independent DoD 
agency under the direction of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and 
Engineering.97 Acting Defense Secretary Patrick Shanahan has made it his goal to have 
the SDA established by March 29, 2019, and he believes the organization could be fully 
operational by the end of 2019.98 Though initially semi-autonomous, the SDA would 
always operate under the assumption that it would transition into a subordinate position 
within the Space Force if the sixth branch were to be established.99 
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Figure 2: Potential Space Force Logos Introduced by White House. 








In order to support the newly revived USSPACECOM with manpower, the Trump 
administration has proposed the creation of the Space Operations Force. This 
organization would be comprised of members from each of the other branches, all of 
whom would receive special space training but remain within their current services until 
the establishment of the Space Force allows them to be gathered under one command.100 
In the interim, members of the Space Operations Force would be on call to provide 
subject matter expertise to combatant commanders and acquisitions professionals from 
the SDA.101 The White House would like the Space Operations Force to be capable of 
deploying its members to U.S. Indo-Pacific Command and U.S. European Command by 
summer 2019.102 Together, the timelines by which the SDA and Space Operations Force 
could stand up their new organizations would determine how quickly the Space Force 
could scale into an effective new branch.103 
Though various other estimates from a number of sources exist, the Trump 
administration plans to allocate an additional $2B and 15,000 personnel to the Space 
Force in its first five years.104 The manpower will come from existing offices within the 
Pentagon, while the source of the $2B is still to be determined. The first years will 
require miniscule additional funding in defense terms, as the DoD will mainly be 
shuffling resources that it already has in place. As the Space Force takes shape, the final 
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years of this period will require about $500M in added tax dollars annually. These figures 
do not encompass the annual $10B in unclassified space-related programs that currently 
exist which the Space Force is expected to absorb.105 In FY20, the DoD plans to establish 
the Space Force as the sixth branch of the military, create its chain of command by 
integrating officers from other branches, and reassign some military and civilian 
personnel to create its initial workforce.106 In FY21 and FY22, the Space Force will begin 
to absorb more units related to space-defense from other services, including satellite 
operation, training, maintenance, and other missions as directed by the SECDEF. In 
FY23 and FY24, the branch will begin to extend its scope and stand up new units to meet 
developing needs, a process necessary to create its own distinct footprint on the DoD.107  
 Authority for the creation of the Space Force rests with Congress. The House and 
Senate Armed Services Committees will both need to approve legislation that directs the 
creation of a new military branch before a vote can be held in either chamber. House and 
Senate leaders will ultimately need to cooperate to pass identical legislation that 
establishes the Space Force before a bill can be presented to President Trump for 
signature.108 The Senate will also have to approve any flag officers that are withdrawn 
from their current branches and nominated to positions created within the Space Force, as 
well as any officers promoted to generalship from within the Space Force. 109 However, 
Congressional approval is not required for the establishment of the SDA or the Space 
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Operations Force.110 As such, President Trump is free to direct the Office of the Secretary 
of Defense to stand up these organizations whenever he pleases.   
 
Policy Analysis  
The objective of Trump’s Space Force proposal is threefold: reduce the number of 
agencies involved in space acquisitions, increase the amount of troops in space-related 
fields, and improve the protection of American interests and assets in outer space. Any 
attempt to measure the potential effectiveness of his plan should therefore focus on these 
central elements. As such, each area of policy change that the Trump administration has 
recommended will ultimately be evaluated on its ability to improve acquisitions 
efficiency, boost DoD space manpower, and/or increase national security relative to the 
current systems and infrastructure in place. They will also be assessed on their feasibility 
and the likelihood that they are able to bring about the results that the Trump 
administration claims. 
 Misconceptions about the Space Force abound, some confusing its mission with 
that of NASA and others seeking to ridicule it as President Trump’s attempt to create the 
world’s first real Stormtroopers.  In reality, the problem that the organization seeks to 
address is certainly real, and the President was far from the first person to suggest its 
creation. There are many in the military community that agree that a centralized 
department dedicated to space would help consolidate missions that do not fit well into 
                                                     





the other branches, eventually providing improved efficiencies for all services.111 These 
reputable and knowledgeable individuals believe that an independent Space Force is 
necessary to create the appropriate emphasis on space development in the DoD, 
comparing this schism to that of the USAF in 1947.112  
These arguments should not be dismissed, but there is a specious quality to 
comparisons between the Space Force in 2019 and the U.S. Army Air Forces (USAAF) 
in 1947. The USAAF had more than 300,000 military personnel in 1947 when it 
separated from the Army to become the USAF, comprising about 20% of the total 
manpower for the Department of War at the time.113 The sheer size of the Air Force, and 
the complexity of its suborganizations, made the urgency for its autonomy evident. Today 
the USAF has approximately 313,000 Airmen, equal to about 24% of DoD troops.114 By 
comparison, the Trump administration has announced that it plans to move only 15,000 
personnel to the new Space Force, equal to only about .7% of the DoD military 
population.115 This percentage is actually generous, as it is a forecast for the new 
department’s manpower in five years and includes civilian personnel. Its budget would 
also be miniscule compared with that of its sister services, equaling less than 2% of the 
Trump administration’s proposed $750B budget for national defense spending.116 
Because this manpower is meant to come from existing DoD programs, the 15,000 
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personnel do not represent an increase in space capacity for the military, but instead 
simply a relabeling of currently-active units. As such, providing the Space Force with 
equal stature to the rest of the DoD branches could provide the service with a 
disproportionately large amount of influence at the expense of the other services that 
comprise the overwhelming majority of the workforce and resources of the U.S. military.  
Despite its comparatively small budget, the establishment of the Space Force 
would still require substantial resources and funding, which concerns some military 
leaders and analysts.117 Enormous funding requirements are problematic because of the 
opportunity costs they impose on other military programs. The billions needed to finance 
the restructuring of the DoD’s space units could be used to replace the aging arsenal of 
Air Force war planes, to renovate the infamously dilapidated barracks at any number of 
Marine Corps bases, to upgrade the end-of-life communications equipment on Navy 
destroyers, or to finance countless other deserving programs within the DoD. Each 
program deprived of Pentagon dollars would argue that some aspect of national security 
is threatened by their lack of funding, so an overly expensive Space Force proposal could 
ultimately have a detrimental effect on American defense if it necessitated repurposing 
funds from enough critical projects.  
The contention regarding the exact amount of money needed to finance the Space 
Force over its first five years has been well-noted, with estimates ranging from $2B - 
$13B.118 The high number came from SECAF Wilson’s office and presumed that the new 
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branch would have a particularly expansive scope. As such, it includes costs associated 
with overhead, “development of doctrine, consolidation of facilities, movement of people 
and families, a service academy or war college, recruiting pipelines, and of course, new 
uniforms.”119 Skeptics insist that Wilson contrived every possible cost and included 
expenses that would be unnecessary in the first few years, such as the service academy 
and new HQ.120 They assert that the Space Force would be able to cut costs by utilizing 
pre-existing building infrastructure and retaining personnel currently employed within the 
DoD to their current positions once their units are transferred to the new department.121  
Accomplishing these objectives would save the DoD billions, but the assumption 
of a neutral budget when transitioning personnel may not be realistic. The government 
could find that many civilian and military workers are unwilling to leave their current 
service to join the fledgling Space Force.122 Their resistance could stem from loyalty to 
their current branch, fear of uncertainty and chaos in the new organization, or political 
unwillingness to support a controversial measure that benefits President Trump’s 
reputation. Massive costs and staffing issues could also occur depending on how the 
Pentagon handles the transition of space-related USAF Reserve and Air National Guard 
units to the Space Force, a process that has yet to be delineated.123  If the DoD 
encountered such a scenario, it would have to spend heavily to recruit and incentivize 
qualified manpower quickly enough to meet the White House’s ambitious timelines, 
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adding significantly to its projected costs. Per a Congressional budget, excess funding to 
compensate for low projections of Space Force spending would need to come from 
elsewhere in the Pentagon, meaning that its sister services would bear the brunt of any 
poor estimates. As such, it stands to reason that the creation of the Space Force could 
present an initial obstruction to the operations of the rest of the DoD if its counterparts 
had to scramble to reprioritize missions in the face of funding realignments.124 A 
sustained hindrance to such a multitude of military programs could ultimately threaten 
national security.   
Though the Space Force is intended to enhance the DoD’s space-related 
manpower and capabilities, there are concerns that the benefits of its creation will not 
offset its adverse consequences enough to merit implementation, and that it may even 
worsen readiness. One of the primary concerns is that the introduction of this new branch 
would hinder relationships between distinct DoD organizations that exist today. Every 
service is heavily dependent upon spacecraft for navigation, communications, and 
intelligence, and they all have particular needs that have been identified through years of 
training. Navy warships, USAF planes, and Army armored brigades all have thousands of 
pieces of equipment that require signals from these DoD satellites, and the process of 
allocating satellite resources to each branch and each mission has been laborious and 
cumbersome.125 Introducing a new organization with command authority could disturb 
this delicate balance of cooperation that functions suitably today. This problem also 
manifests itself at both a strategic and tactical level when services try to determine 
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jurisdiction when carrying out their respective missions. Another service provides yet 
another stakeholder that needs to be accounted for when assigning areas of 
responsibility.126 Adding further intricacy to the already complex joint strategies 
developed at the Pentagon may prove to be more problematic for national defense than 
helpful.  
   Proponents of the Space Force cite the problems that arise from the lack of “a 
unified, stable cadre of space-centric personnel that focus on developing space-centric 
strategy, doctrine, and policy,” and the corresponding space-focused chain of 
command.127 Many skeptics would agree that there is merit to the assertion that the U.S. 
will be better able to defend its orbital interests if it creates a coherent space organization 
to manage satellite infrastructure. However, the reestablishment of USSPACECOM 
could solve many of the issues that Space Force advocates lament today.128 The 
combatant command, whose establishment is already in the works, will be led by a four-
star general meant to serve as an advocate for DoD space power. Providing such a 
powerful and established leader to the organization will make the process of 
consolidating space-related efforts more effective, allaying some concerns of Space Force 
proponents.129 In addition, as the combatant command for space operations, 
USSPACECOM will be responsible for completing the actual warfighting mission of 
defending U.S. space assets. As such, it is going to complete much of the leg work 
involved with developing and defining its role within the joint DoD landscape before any 
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sixth branch could be fielded.130 This means that, provided USSPACECOM carries out 
its mission successfully, it will already have accomplished many of the goals that the 
Trump administration hopes to achieve with its Space Force, making the new service 
entirely unnecessary. As such, many experts today call for an incremental approach to 
changes in the DoD’s space posture, rather than a single, monumental change 
necessitating that multiple new organizations be stood up simultaneously.131  
 Because USSPACECOM is expected to address many of the Space Force’s goals, 
some industry experts believe that the exact mission and scope of the Space Force is still 
too undefined to warrant its creation, especially by 2020 as the Trump administration has 
proposed. The six images introduced by the Trump administration as possible logos for 
the Space Force have only added to the confusion and made determining the veracity of 
the policy proposal more complicated.132 The logo designs were released in August 2018 
to allow internet users to vote for their favorite option, but the presence of various 
iconography has indicated to many Space Force skeptics that the federal government has 
yet to develop a coherent doctrine for the service. The designs on the top row of Figure 2 
are all clear replications of current and former NASA logos, a surprising allusion because 
the President has promised that NASA’s missions would not be absorbed into the Space 
Force.133  One different design features an image of the Moon, while another shows a 
rocket heading into orbit with the text “MARS AWAITS” written above. Again, these 
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references seem to imply that the Space Force’s mission would involve planetary 
exploration in some way, a notion that is directly contradictory to the narrative currently 
being proponed by the White House.134 The presence of this seemingly confused imagery 
in the official Space Force logo proposal could indicate that the Space Force’s pioneering 
advocates are not united in their vision and goals for the new organization. If this is the 
case, it will be far more difficult for the DoD to implement the proposed policy in a 
beneficial manner, thereby making success for the Space Force in any of its targeted 
areas less likely. 
 The processes and consequences of establishing the Space Operations Force are, 
on the surface, less problematic than those of the Space Force. The Space Ops Force is 
supposed to be composed entirely of space personnel who already work in the other five 
branches of the military. These workers will remain in their current services and positions 
while on-call to provide subject matter expertise to USSPACECOM, thereby reducing the 
strain on the rest of the DoD.135 This solution is meant to be a reasonable compromise 
that gives the new combatant command much-needed brainpower with minimal 
disruptions to the rest of the military, but it still presents a number of challenges. Though 
the Space Ops Force is intended to mitigate interference with current missions, units 
whose members are drafted into this new organization would likely experience some 
level of adversity as they try to cope with reduced manning.136 This type of strain has 
already been seen in the USAF, which is expected to provide the bulk of the Space Ops 
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Force. Airmen have long suffered from the burden of ‘additional duties,’ or 
administrative and unit functions tasked to members on top of their primary mission. 
These duties often seem innocent at first look, but in practice they can consume the 
majority of an Airman’s time at work, reducing attention to the big-picture mission. For 
this reason, the USAF reduced the number of additional duties that could be meted out to 
unit members in 2016.137 Bringing personnel into the Space Ops Force could therefore 
task them with an additional duty tantamount to an entire full-time position, particularly 
if USSPACECOM relies more heavily on this force that anticipated. This added 
workload could dramatically reduce productivity, readiness, and morale for the troops 
conscripted into the Space Ops Force, making it more difficult for them to perform both 
their new and current duties effectively. Relying on a beleaguered cadre of overworked 
military personnel may prevent the burgeoning Space Ops Force, and a potential Space 
Force, from adequately protecting American assets and achieving U.S. space dominance.  
 Because of the added strain to augment the Space Ops Force while achieving the 
objectives of their current missions, military members of the new organization could 
experience high stress and low morale, two issues that are common in the military and 
contagious within a unit.138 These concerns could be compounded if the members’ 
additional duties within the Space Ops Force required increased travel and time away 
from family. These same issues exist for government civilians and contractors who are 
asked to join the group, only they have more leverage to resist such a realignment of their 
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duties as non-military employees.139 Contractors in particular, who oftentimes provide 
the most specialized expertise in a given field, operate under tight restrictions per the 
terms of the government’s contract with their companies.140 The defense firms that 
partner with the military to provide manning may be unwilling to accommodate a 
dramatic change in the scope of their employees’ work, or else demand a high premium 
to do so. If the DoD is unable to retain the government civilians and contractors that it 
intends to add to the Space Ops Force, not only will it be unable to sustain the 15,000 
existing positions it eventually plans to transfer to the Space Force, but it could actually 
lose manpower in space-related DoD programs.  
 Like the Space Force and the Space Operations Force, the Space Development 
Agency (SDA) presents a promising opportunity with serious concerns attached. There 
are currently more than 60 federal agencies that have purview over some aspect of space 
acquisitions, providing a massive and confusing bureaucracy that can delay and inhibit 
the expeditious fielding of war-winning capabilities.141 The SDA is supposed to provide a 
solution by consolidating many of these missions into one streamlined organization, 
saving valuable time, resources, and taxpayers dollars. Proponents of the SDA are 
justified in their criticisms of the current process, and they are not the first to suggest the 
creation of a parent organization to help bring synergy to military acquisitions.142  The 
DoD believes that the SDA will add value and save money by purchasing Commercial-
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Off-The-Shelf (COTS) equipment and decreasing the administrative hurdles that add to 
lengthy procurement timelines.143 By providing relatively specific information about how 
the SDA plans to address the problems that exist in the space acquisitions community, the 
DoD has made its establishment more legitimate and defendable.  
 Nonetheless, many remain skeptical about the SDA. They would argue that its 
plan for saving money, which centers on using existing technologies produced by private 
firms, is already a standard best practice in acquisitions. Program management offices 
have emphasized the cost, schedule, and performance benefits of using COTS equipment 
for well over 25 years, so the DoD’s plan does not offer any innovations that are not 
already standard in the 60 space stakeholder agencies.144 In addition, the SDA is not 
intended to do anything that the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and the Space 
and Missile Systems Centers do not already do.145 If the SDA was meant to replace these 
organizations, then merging their missions into one larger organization could conceivably 
create economies of scale (albeit with some additional issues). However, there is no 
indication that the DoD will shut down or dismember either of these organizations, 
meaning that if the SDA were created they would have to coexist with yet another 
department that has a similar mission. In fact, the DoD has not said that any of those 60 
organizations would be eliminated, leading skeptics to fear that the SDA would simply 
become another contributor to the mass of groups seeking to steer space acquisitions.146 
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Even if the SDA could set itself apart and absorb a majority of the missions from those 
60 other federal entities, the new organization would find that some level of 
decentralization in acquisitions is beneficial.147 Giving smaller command chains the 
flexibility to acquire their own equipment leads to more agile procurement and better 
tailored solutions.148 Trying to unite the entire spectrum of space acquisitions into one 
massive bureaucracy could make delegation even more difficult, regardless of how well 
the SDA executes its mission. As such, the SDA could be stuck between a rock and a 
hard place, either too small to distinguish itself from the rest of the fray, or so large that it 
adds burdensome and costly procedures to the acquisition units. 
 In all, though the Trump administration’s Space Force proposal does include 
elements that could potentially bolster U.S. space posture and improve space acquisitions, 
these outcomes are far from certain. Serious concerns regarding the cost, structure, 
timing, and feasibility of the Space Force, the Space Ops Force, and the Space 
Development Agency have kept many experts from endorsing the White House’s plan. 
The need to address emerging threats in space is clear and widely acknowledged, but the 
efficacy of creating these new organizations to do so is certainly not.  
   
Political Analysis 
Because the DoD spends over $280B per year on defense contracts, receiving 
defense industry support will be critical to developing effective and affordable 
                                                     







partnerships with the firms that would provide key resources for the Space Force.149 
There is a sentiment among many Space Force advocates that the private sector would 
support the new branch’s creation due to the potential for a windfall to the defense 
contracting industry. These companies employ millions of Americans, many of whom 
live in swing states, so the promise of more money and more jobs could play well with 
blue-collar workers in these areas.150 An increased emphasis on space capabilities and 
readiness could very well bring additional funding for new acquisitions, and the Trump 
administration has already signaled that it plans to allocate billions to the establishment 
of the service. However, industry experts are skeptical the Space Force payout will be as 
large as defense contractors hope.151 The Pentagon will attempt to finance as much of the 
new service as possible with existing DoD dollars, as the White House could expect 
negative press if it had to reallocate money from entirely unrelated federal programs to 
provide seed funding for the project.152 As such, defense firms may simply see funds 
move from one organization to another.  
In addition, new Space Force cash may not necessarily be destined for high-priced 
private contracts to be awarded to the large defense firms that operate in purple states. 
According to Tom Nichols, a professor of national security affairs at the U.S. Naval War 
College, “any additional spending will likely be concentrated in research and knowledge-
centric areas, not depressed manufacturing states.”153 Nichols also noted that contracts 
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for new weaponry, which can create thousands of manufacturing jobs and be the most 
lucrative for defense firms, are almost certainly not forthcoming. He wrote that "put 
simply: We are not going to start building Klingon battle cruisers or the Moonraker fleet 
in West Virginia or Ohio."154 Altogether, the Trump administration’s plan to increase 
funding for space operations and acquisitions could please many defense firms, but there 
is no guarantee that the Space Force would bring substantial material benefit to any 
particular company or region of the country.155 
The support of the troops is also an important factor to consider, as the military is 
a key issue for many swing state voters. Republicans have traditionally been more 
successful in appealing to pro-military households, so the Democratic Party could stand 
to gain ground in purple districts if it was perceived to be in tune with the interests and 
desires of servicewomen and men.156 According to an anonymous survey of active duty 
military personnel, 40% of those polled supported the creation of the new branch, while 
37% disapproved.157 Troops from the Navy and the Air Force, which would see the 
largest reduction in manpower and funding if the Space Force were established, 
overwhelmingly disapproved, while their counterparts in the Army and the Marine Corps 
were much more receptive.158 This poll did not include any reservists or national 
guardsmen, but these individuals may be more hesitant to propone the Space Force 
because there is currently no plan for how it will operate with or within either of these 
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organizations.159 There is speculation that the Space Force could either absorb or replace 
some missions currently carried out by the Air Force Reserve Command and Air National 
Guard, meaning that members of these major commands could be displaced.160 Given the 
stratified nature of the poll results and the uncertainty surrounding the status of many 
guard and reserve units, it is clear that the creation of the new service remains a 
controversial topic among DoD troops, one that certainly does not have unequivocal 
support from a large majority of personnel. As such, backing legislation to create the 
Space Force would by no means endear the Democratic Party to the military at large, its 
advocates, or voters in districts with a sizeable military presence. 
Though polling indicates that the Space Force proposal enjoys support from a 
slight majority of uniformed personnel, it is clear that much of the military leadership that 
would be directly involved with its implementation does not espouse its creation. The 
initial opposition from USAF Chief of Staff General David Goldfein, SECAF Heather 
Wilson, and SECDEF James Mattis has been well documented, each having expressed 
skepticism prior to Trump’s announcement of his intention to bring the Space Force to 
life.161 These three and many Air Force general officers later articulated their support for 
the President and his new service, but only after such time that it would have been 
inappropriate and even insubordinate to express their views candidly if they disagreed 
with the President’s decision.162 Military personnel can be subject to court martial under 
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the Uniform Code of Military Justice if they speak out publicly against their 
commander’s directions, making it unlikely that any general officers would voice 
concerns if they had them.163 The eventual resignations of Mattis and Wilson from their 
posts could be viewed as emphatic rebukes of not only the Space Force concept, but the 
entire Trump military doctrine at large, though neither specifically mentioned the new 
service upon leaving office.164  
Having the real support of military leadership, support that goes beyond the 
obligatory responsibility of DoD officials to follow orders, is crucial to making any 
sweeping changes to military structures, since those who privately oppose the direction 
can hinder progress. Secretary Mattis was widely believed to have “slow walked” a 
number of the President’s directives, including the Space Force, transgender ban, and 
military parade, publicly announcing his intention to bring them to fruition while 
practically ensuring the slowest possible implementation.165 It could be argued that the 
resignations of these disagreeing officials has only ensured that the remaining personnel 
are more amenable to the service, but there is simply no way to ascertain whether specific 
officials truly believe in the Space Force vision. Acting SECDEF Patrick Shanahan has 
been vocal in his support for the Space Force, but Mattis’ example shows that military 
leaders with strong opposition to certain policy issues can provide substantial 
obstructions to a project’s success.166 Given the proximity to the 2020 elections, any 
                                                     
163 “Uniform Code of Military Justice,” United States Air Force, accessed April 3, 2019, 
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ucmj.htm. 
164 Mark F Cancian, Todd Harrison, and Andrew Philip Hunter, “The Mattis Resignation: What Does it 
Mean for the Future of National Security?” Center for Strategic & International Studies, December 21, 
2018, https://www.csis.org/analysis/mattis-resignation-what-does-it-mean-future-national-security. 
165 Helene Cooper, “Jim Mattis, Defense Secretary, Resigns in Rebuke of Trump’s Worldview.” 






remaining dissenters in the DoD leadership could simply create delays in hopes that 
Trump loses his reelection bid and a new regime decides to ditch the Space Force 
altogether. For this reason, Congressional support for the Space Force in the interim may 
ultimately seem unwise, since a new President could choose to scrap the idea in less than 
two years.  
Even if the Space Force was certain to provide a boon to the defense industry and 
gain support from the bulk of DoD personnel, Democrats would still have less to gain 
from establishing the new branch than President Trump. After all, he was the one who 
brought the idea of the service to the fore, thereby setting himself up to take credit for any 
positive outcomes that emerge. Trump has been touting the benefits of the Space Force at 
political rallies ever since he announced the organization in June 2018, listing it as a part 
of his platform along with his positions on controversial subjects like abortion, gun 
rights, and border security.167 His 2020 campaign also began selling Space Force 
merchandise in August 2018, demonstrating his desire to use the new service for his 
personal political gain in the upcoming presidential election.168 In doing so, Trump has 
politicized the creation of the Space Force and turned the movement to bring it to fruition 
into a necessarily partisan issue. The Space Force’s establishment could therefore become 
the equivalent of building Trump’s wall along the Southern border: not an inherently 
unreasonably proposition, but one that would provide so much fodder to Trump’s base 
that it would not make sense for Democrats to support it.169  
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Opposing the Trump administration’s proposal could also endear the Democratic 
Party to some swing voters who are already exasperated with the President’s attempts to 
usurp certain responsibilities from Congress. Seeing Trump shift resources from existing 
military branches to fund a controversial project could remind many voters of his national 
emergency declaration, which took funding from the DoD to fund the border wall that he 
promised during his campaign.170 This decision angered many Americans, 60% of whom 
disapproved of the President’s plan to shuffle military funding to pay for an expansion of 
border wall construction, according to a recent Gallup poll.171 Many Congressional 
Republicans even objected to this scheme, as 13 House and 12 Senate GOP members 
voted to block Trump’s national emergency declaration.172 These numbers show that 
normally-conservative individuals can be compelled to buck the President’s platform if 
they feel that it intrudes on the balance of power stipulated in the Constitution.  
With this in mind, the White House’s Space Force proposal could be viewed as 
another example of overreach by the Trump administration when viewed in context with 
the executive actions that the President has enacted. The DoD has already begun the 
process of designing and preparing the SDA and the Space Operations Force, two 
organizations that Trump is able to stand up without Congressional approval. However, 
both are designed to exist as independent bodies only temporarily, until Congress enacts 
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legislation to found the Space Force.173 Once these organizations are established, Trump 
would have more leverage to demand his new service by arguing that the DoD needs it to 
integrate the work of the SDA, Space Ops Force, and USSPACECOM.174 In other words, 
Trump would be creating a scenario in which none of his new space agencies can 
function effectively without a Space Force, thereby strong-arming Congress into 
approving the new branch in the name of salvaging national security.  
Democrats could benefit by publicizing this narrative and arguing that their 
opposition to the Space Force is founded in Constitutionalism rather than partisanship. 
Democratic opposition would appeal to the 55% of Americans who already disapprove of 
the new service, but it may also convince some of the more politically moderate Space 
Force supporters to defect.175 Many independent swing voters consider themselves to be 
Constitutionalists, so opposing Trump’s Space Force on the grounds that it runs afoul of 
the document could yield valuable votes in the 2020 election. These moderate votes are 
critical for Democrats in purple states because earning one vote from the middle of the 
political spectrum also takes away one possible vote from the Republicans, as opposed to 
earning votes from the far left which could never be earned by a Republican candidate.176 
Nonetheless, neither the Republicans nor the Democrats in Congress have fully 
consolidated their parties to either support or resist the proposition. The Congressmen 
who originally sought to include Space Force language in the FY18 NDAA, Mike Rogers 
(R – AL) and Jim Cooper (D – TN), hail from different parties, showing that there is at 
                                                     
173 Sandra Erwin, “Space Development Agency to be part of Griffin’s defense research organization.” 
174 Ibid. 
175 Grace Sparks, “Space Force: To 37% and beyond,” CNN, August 16, 2018, 
https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/16/politics/space-force-poll/index.html. 






least some level of Congressional Democratic support for the organization.177 Other 
influential Democrats, such as Rep. Adam Smith (D-WA), the new Chairman of the 
HASC, remain uncertain, if not outright opposed.178 Given the Democratic control of the 
House, a vote on the Space Force could face a challenge even making it out of 
committee, but skepticism exists even within the GOP.179 Rep. Mac Thornberry (R-TX), 
former Chairman of the HASC and a supporter of the Space Force, has cautioned the 
Pentagon about its approach, saying “our job is not to just swallow whatever [the 
administration] sends us.”180 Chairman James Inhofe (R-OK) of the Senate Armed 
Services Committee has openly questioned the efficacy of the new service, and the 
Republican controlled Senate is actually believed to present a higher hurdle than the 
House.181 If the Republicans were unified in their desire to create the new service, the 
Democrats could leverage the GOP’s eagerness and strike a deal that allows them to pass 
their own trademark legislation as well. However, the Republicans have yet to rally 
around the Space Force to an extent that would give Democrats a substantial advantage to 
negotiate on other issues, so there does not appear to be any strategic political advantage 
to supporting the White House proposal. 
A final, more fundamental issue surrounds the very premise of militarizing space. It 
has been established that some countries could seek to attack American assets in space, 
and that the U.S. is entirely justified in seeking to employ its extensive defense systems 
to protect them. Creating an entirely new branch of the military to address these concerns, 
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however, could be viewed as provocative and aggressive behavior by the rest of the 
world. The introduction and deployment of powerful new defense mechanisms has been 
perceived as such in the past, most recently by North Korea when the Pentagon stood up 
its Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (T.H.A.A.D.) system near Seoul, South Korea 
in 2018.182 Bolstering one’s defenses in such an obvious manner leads some foreign 
powers to infer that the U.S. plans on acting provocatively in the near future, looking to 
negate the possibility of retaliation beforehand.183 The U.S. already has a record of 
ignoring international convention in space, having been one of three nations to abstain 
from the 2000 U.N. General Assembly vote on a resolution titled “Prevention of Outer 
Space Arms Race.”184 The U.S. would later be the only U.N. nation to vote against a 
2006 resolution aimed at preventing the competitive proliferation of weaponry in 
space.185 American allies, and even Russia and China, by contrast have been much more 
amenable to restrictions on the use of arms in the cosmos, so there may be pushback from 
important world players if the U.S. appears to bolster its offensive and defensive space 
posture.186 Regardless of the official narrative that the White House seeks to promote 
with the creation of the Space Force, it is possible that many countries will bemoan the 
new organization as a promise of increased tension in an environment that is currently 
peaceful.   
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 It is recommended that Speaker of the House Pelosi not support the White 
House’s proposal for a Space Force, Space Development Agency, or Space Operations 
Force. Though the President has the authority to create the latter two organizations 
without the approval of Congress, the promise of staunch opposition to the Space Force 
in the House may deter him from diverting considerable resources to them for fear that 
his new branch would never come to fruition.  
That said, the Trump administration’s Space Force proposal has many reasonable 
elements, many of which have been recommended by senior military leaders for 
decades.187 The creation of the new service, and its subordinate SDA and Space 
Operations Force, is meant to address a problem that has been proven to exist: the 
increasing ability of U.S. space-faring adversaries to disrupt American interests in outer 
space.188 Even with the massive advantage of the U.S. in military spending, the Pentagon 
is currently unable to defend against crude and relatively inexpensive attacks on 
American assets. Countries like Russia and China would only have to guide their existing 
satellites into the orbital paths of American satellites to destroy them, with the potential 
to disrupt military readiness and communications, as well as civilian commerce and 
connectivity.189 It is clear that the DoD must do more to combat the emerging threats to 
                                                     
187 Todd Harrison, “Why We Need a Space Force.” 






the American system of satellites, given their growing importance to everyday life across 
the world.  
 Nonetheless, given the executive actions that the President has already carried out 
to support his emphasis on space innovation, namely the resurrection of USSPACECOM, 
there is no logical need to create a sixth branch of the armed forces to help bolster 
American space readiness.  The concept that the Space Force would need to exist to 
provide manpower for USSPACECOM is nonsensical, as none of the other 10 combatant 
commands that exist today require their own service to supply personnel.190 Rather, when 
troops deploy to U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) or U.S. Special Operations 
Command (USSOCOM), for example, they remain in their service and simply work 
together with members of other branches in a joint environment. A soldier deploying to 
USSOUTHCOM does not leave the Army to join the ‘South Force,’ nor does a sailor 
deploying to USSOCOM leave the Navy to join the ‘Special Force.’ As such, there is no 
reason that troops supporting the revived USSPACECOM need to abandon their service 
to join the Space Force.  
The creation of the Space Force is perhaps the most invasive, expensive, and 
bureaucratic solution to ensuring American dominance in space.191  Any increases in 
space funding, additions to space manning, changes to space acquisitions, or adjustments 
to space doctrine could be made within the existing organizations that already carry out 
DoD space operations. The White House’s own proposal stipulates that all of the 
manpower for the Space Force would come from existing DoD personnel who are 
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already fulfilling the roles that they would have in the new organization, meaning that the 
establishment of the service would simply give a new name to the mission that these 
individuals currently complete.192 The dearth of authentic support from military leaders 
prior to their forced acceptance of Trump’s mandate should provide ample indication that 
many experts in the field do not believe that the service is necessary.193 As such, Speaker 
Pelosi should not be persuaded to advocate for the Space Force by arguments related to 
its military utility. 
 Instead, it is recommended that Speaker Pelosi promote the new USSPACECOM 
vigorously, arguing for its merit and ability to solve many of the DoD’s concerns without 
the need for new supplemental organizations. The Democrats at large should call for 
patience within the DoD, contending that it would be best to wait a few years to 
determine the successes and deficiencies of USSPACECOM before taking any further 
drastic measures.194 She could appear magnanimous by praising the President for his 
work in bringing the command back to operation, but the Democrats would still reap the 
political benefits of denying Trump his new service, an accomplishment that he certainly 
would have touted on his campaign for reelection. This approach offers just as much 
support for improved national security as Trump’s Space Force proposal, saves the 
government billions of dollars, and provides important fodder for the eventual 
Democratic presidential nominee in 2020.    
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